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I. iNTRODUCTION
Within tort law's last two decades, few subjects have bedeviled more
commentators and animated more advocates than has the venerable institution of
punitive damages.' Proponents of unfettered access to exemplary awards in instances
of egregious misconduct assert that punitive damages are an essential incentive to
important accident litigation. Their argument is that without access to such awards, or
with availability limitedby a diverse array oflimitations, injuredparties seeldngjustice
will face an imposing hurdle in securing counsel willing to subsidize the costs
associated with bringing complex litigation.
* Charles A. FreaueffProfessor and Distinguished Professor of Law, Pace University School of
Law.
1. See generally RICHARD A. EPsTEIN, TORTS 458 (1999).
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Opponents of punitive damages, whose proposals range from damage caps or
restrictive formulae to outright elimination, describe punitive damages as an unruly
doctrinal foundling, capable of outrageous and wanton excess, and incapable of
placement in any traditional tort structure. The distillate of such arguments is that
unmediated punitive damages have no ad valolam effect in accident law, serve no
progressive contemporary tort objective, preserve the specter of ungoverned
overdeterrence, and "appear to be an anomaly, a hybrid in search of a rationale."'
This Essay reviews the common law matrix inwhichpunitive damages have been
placed and the current availability of such awards in the several states. It continues by
discussing the two most conspicuous doctrinal evaluative tools: (1) Corrective
Justice/Morality; and (2) Economic Efficiency, examining the value of each of these
in responding to avoidable and tortious harm. The Essay describes why neither
corrective justice nor efficiency provides a satisfactory rationale for imposition of
punitive damages. However, and perhaps ironically, these very limitations form part
of the rationale for the availability of exemplary awards against actors whose conduct
is extreme.
This Essay then treats the United States Supreme Court's substantial andrepeated
recent forays into the subject, including it's gloss on the Due Process, Excessive Fines,
and Review Clauses. In conclusion, this Essay asserts that the independent but related
state legislative and Supreme Court efforts to domesticate punitive damages have been
largely successful in creating a favorable, albeit ungainly, fair, and rational position for
punitive damages.
II. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, ACCIDENT LAW, AND TORT NORMS
A. A Classical Treatment ofRemediesfor Accidental Injuries
At early common law, an injury or loss having its immediate and uninterrupted
cause attributable to the direct application of force by another could trigger an
indemnificatory obligation in the actor. The earliest tort remedy for money reparations
was made available to those suffering injury to their person or property caused by the
actors' intentional (although not criminally malicious) and direct application of force.3
As so many accidental injuries involved causal sequences in which temporal or other
variables relegated the actor's conduct to amore remote, but still causally premierrole,
the orthodox trespass restriction operatedto deny manyworthy claimants ofaremedy,
while leaving an equivalent number of wrongdoers undeterred from continuation of the
2. Marc Galanter &David Luban,PoeticJustice: Punitive Damages andLegalPluralism, 42 AM.
U. L. REV. 1393, 1393 (1993).
3. See generally C.H.S. FIFOoT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW: TORT AND
CONTRACT 44 (1949). "Mayhem and battery were at first claimed as the ancestors of Trespass, but a
later preference has been indicated for robbery, as suggestive both of trespass to the person and of
trespass to goods." Id. (citations omitted).
1176 [Vol. 53:1175
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risk-elevating conduct English courts therefore created leave to petitionfor aremedy
termed"trespass onthe special case,"permitting an action-by-action evaluation. Thus,
in actions in "special case," recovery was permitted to those injured in more elaborate
causal sequences, such as when the actor's dereliction put into motion, or left
uncorrected, a force ora circumstance thatwould later cause the claimantharm or loss.
The nomenclature "trespass on the special case" adequately described courts'
amenability to examine the particular circumstances of a loss to determine if
compensation was just. Put another way, as a large proportion of such suits arose from
scenarios in which the injury was occasioned by the actor's careless, rather than
deliberate (though notpurposefully harmful) actions, actions in"special case" created
aremedy inmonetary liability for the multitude of actions in which the injury arose not
by the actor's direct application of force, but rather by a sequence of causal factors.
Courts limitedthis enlargement of tort liabilityby addingthe requirement that save
in limited circumstances,6 the plaintiff's prima facie case needed proof that the
defendantnot only caused the injury, butthathe was also in some degree at fault.7 This
cause of action therefore accommodated a more nuanced causation proof, but at the
same time, it elevated the plaintiff' s burden by requiring a showing of fault. Thus, the
standard developed was the direct precursor to negligence liability.
The negligence regimen, withimportant sculpting in theproducts liability domain
and elsewhere, has withstood time's test as a largely adequate set ofrules for ordering
liability and risk reduction in the modem marketplace. As tort doctrine serves as a
moral and cultural bellwether of social expectations, values, and objectives, the
negligence rules governing or at least influencing accident law generally, andproducts
liability inparticular, have provided a sturdy legal proxy for this nation's sentiment that
reducing avoidable injuries inures to the public welfare.
B. Remedies for More Aggravated Tortious Misconduct
Early on, however, it was recognized that the law of negligence was only capable
ofresponding to "offthe shelf' examples of substandard conduct and consequentharm
Its optimal suitability was effectuating justice between the injured plaintiff and the
negligent tortfeasor, by providing indemnification for the plaintiffs proved loss, and
reinstating, insofar as money damages could do so, the plaintiff in the position he
enjoyed prior to the harm.
4. Commentators often noted the trespass doctrine's incapacity to provide a remedy for the
accident in which the defendant, who was constructing a home along a road, accidentally left a beam
ofwood in the road, whichhours later caused theplaintiff's nocturnal carriage accident. However, the
"action on the case" cause of action allowed the court to examine such a situation to make an
individualized determination of liability.
5. See generally FiFOOTsupra note 4, at 66-92 (using the heading "The Development ofActions
on the Case").
6. For example, liability for abnormally dangerous activities and defamation.
7. Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850); see ROBERT L. RABIN, PERSPECTIVES ON
TORT LAW 14 n.2 (4th ed. 1995).
2002] 1177
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What, though, of particularly egregious conduct? Was a more draconian
mechanism appropriate or necessary to respond to a defendant whose conduct
exceeded ordinary ignorant or incautious carelessness, and could insteadbe described
as willful, wanton, or even purposeful? Ought there not be a punishment (albeit civil)
thatwas more severe for the actorwhose conductwas more outrageous andwillful than
that of the actor whose tort might be nothing more than an unknowing mistake?
The common law recognized that such aggravated misconduct warranted a more
vigorous tort remedy for application by the civil justice system. Such a response, it
followed, must necessarily go beyond ordinary indemnification and impose additional
penalties that would serve to punish the actor, to make an example of him, and to more
publicly pronounce-to others that such conduct was intolerable.
Frederick Pollack noted that the nineteenth century "English law" typography of
"Personal Wrongs," which included "[w]rongs affecting safety and freedom of the
person," contemplated a type of wrong that was "willful or wanton."' According to
Pollack, such a special or aggravated wrong was either"intended to do harm, or, being
an act evidently likely to cause harm [and] is done with reckless indifference to what
may befall by reason of it."9 In the context of intentional torts, Pollack's
characterization hearkened ofthe same outrageousness that is noted today as sufficient
to stimulate community outrage. Pollack concluded that such wrongs where "there is
[either] deliberate injury, or there is something like the self-seeking indulgence of
passion, in contempt of another man's rights and dignity," ought be considered not
only "legal wrongs" but also wrongs that are properly "the subject of strong moral
condemnation."'"
The approach of justice administered with an eye towards such "public
condemnation" is aprimary tenet of the modem law of punitive damages, as embraced
in one form or another in the majority of American jurisdictions. The laws of Great
Britain, where punitive damages were founded, provides punitive damage awards for
particular forms and qualities of risk-creating behavior. Civil Justice Rule 7(D)
provides: "Damages are essentially compensatory in nature. In certain circumstances
damages may notbe compensatory." The commentary to the rule explains, in pertinent
part: "Damages maybe contemptuous, nominal, exemplary or (aggravated) punitive."
In research collected by Professors Khan, Robson, and Smith," one learns that British
tribunals award "exemplary" damages "to teach the defendant a lesson," including
circumstances in which "the defendant's conduct has been calculated by him to make




8. FREDERICK POLLACK, THE LAW OF TORTS: A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF OBLIGATIONS
ARISING FROM CIVIL WRONGS IN THE COMMON LAW 9 (Stevens & Sons, Ltd., 2d ed. 1890).
9. Id. In this regard, Pollack's classification was, concededly, confined to the intentional torts of
"[a]ssault, battery, false imprisonment." Id. at 7.
10. Id. at 9. He concludes in language explicit in its Greco Roman and Judeo-Christian affinities,
"If anyone desires to be satisfied of this, he may open Homer or the Psalter at random." Id.
11. MALCOLM KHAN ETAL., CLINICAL NEGLIGENCE (2d ed. 2002)
12. Id. at 290-291.
1178 [Vol. 53: 1175
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Whether it is realistic to attribute to punitive damages success in achieving the
goals ofpunishment, and deterrence, has been questioned by at least two arguments.
First, punitive damages will not necessarily punish the wrongdoer, who will simply
internalize the cost by raising the prices of its goods or services and pass them along
to the consumer. Second, the insurer's duty to defend and duty to indemnify under the
conventional Comprehensive General Liability Policy transfers both the cost of
litigation and the responsibility to pay damages to the defendant's insurance carrier. 3
As to the argument that the cost of any judgment will simply be passed along to
the consumer, a Wisconsin appellate court explained that this attempt at expediency
would not be invariably available to the defendant in a vehicular design lawsuit:
It does not follow under economic logic that a punitive damage
award will be passed on in whole or in part as a cost of doing
business. It may or may not, depending upon Ford's price standing
inrelationto its competitors andits own financial condition. It could
mean lowerprofits forFord. It couldresultin stockholder complaints
about a lowerprofit margin because ofpunitive damage awards for
unsafe cars, thereby spurring Ford on to exercise more care in the
safe design of its automobiles. It could result in a greater scrutiny by
Ford's management ofits auto design from the safety standpoint. All
of these changes, withthe exception oflowerprofits or higher costs,
if they were to take place, would benefit the public as a whole. 4
Regarding the second potential that insurance would vitiate any punitive impact of
such awards, many states provide that insurance against punitive damages is void as
inconsistent with public policy."
I. EVALUATION OF TE BONA FIDES OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. Generally
Skepticism about the value, govemability, or both of exemplary damages has
been debated among academicians since the nineteenth century.'6 Some
commentators focused on the perceived incongruity between the exemplary damage
13. This nomenclature does not distort the recognition thatpunitive damages arenot rectificatory
orindemnificatory, as suchgoals are satisfied through the award ofcompensatory damages. Rather, the
indemnification described here, should itbe available, is the insurance carrier's duty to indemnify the
insured for the payment of anyjudgement, even though, in the ordinary course of such transactions, it
is not the actor that satisfies the judgment to the successful plaintiff, but rather the carrier.
14. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 452 (Wis. 1980) (quoting from Judge Barland
in Barager v. Ford Motor Co., 293 N.W.2d 924 (Wis. 1980)).
15. See, e.g.,NorthwestemNat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d432, 442 (5th Cir. 1962) (finding
that "public policy forbids an insurer and an insured to enter into an insurance contract covering
punitive damages"); see generally DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES:
DAAGEs-EQurrY-REsTrTUToN 336 n.6 (2d ed. 1993) (collecting authority).
16. THoMAs H. KOENIG &MICHAEL L. RusTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORTS LAW 41 (2001).
11792002]
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penalty as inconsistent with tort law's compensatory goal, even going so far as to
suggest that punitive damage awards should escheat to the state. 7
In our modem setting, the final verdict on the value of punitive damages certainly
must be interpreted through the societal expectations ofpersonal integrity and general
welfare as expressed through the law of torts. Over time, accident law has developed
distinctive liability doctrines with the dual objectives of deterring risk-elevating
behavior and encouraging more societally beneficial conduct. In pursuing these
objectives, the Corrective Justice/Morality (Corrective Justice) 8 approach and the
Law and Economics/Economic Efficiency (Economic Efficiency)19 approaches have
dramatically affected legal education and scholarship as well as the common law and
statutory development of the law governing money damages for accidental injuries.
B. Corrective Justice/Morality
The older of the two principal approaches is commonly termed Corrective
Justice, and its influential group of scholars hew to the position that the original and
still primary goal of tort law, including the law of products liability, is righting
wrongs caused by tortious behavior. With its strong overlay of moral obligation, and
the annulment of a wrongdoer's unjust enrichment, the Corrective Justice approach
posits that tort law's principal raison d'6tre is to return parties suffering physical
injury or property damage due to another's tortious conduct to the status quo ante, at
least insofar as money damages can so do.2" Notwithstanding the occasional argument
of the Economic Efficiency supporters which herald that efficiency precepts explain
most purely the deterrence effects of tort liability rules, a corollary to the Corrective
Justice thesis has always been that in addition to its rectificatory goal, the Corrective
Justice model also advances the societal objective of reducing the occurrence of
17. Id.
18. See generally Robert E. Litan et al., The U.S. Liability System: Background and Trends, in
LIABILITY: PERsPEcTIvEs AND POLICY 1 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds. 1988).
Injuries pose three different and potentially conflicting challenges for all societies.
One is efficiently to deter behavior that causes injuries. A second and related
objective is to exact retribution against those responsible .... The third challenge
is to compensate victims for their injuries.... Tort lau-rules allowing accident
victims to seek compensation through the judicial system from the parties
responsible-can be considered a mechanism for meeting all three of these
challenges.
Id. at 3.
19. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986).
20. Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
TORT LAW 53 (David G. Owen ed. 1995). "[C]orrective justice is the principle that those who are
responsible for the wrongful losses of others have a duty to repair them, and that the core of tort law
embodies this conception ofcorrectivejustice."Id.; see Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of TorLaw:
Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REv. 1801 (1997). "Currently there are
two major camps of tort scholars. One understands tort liability as an instrument aimed largely at the
goal ofdeterrence, commonly explained within the framework ofeconomics. The other looks at tort law
as a way of achieving corrective justice between the parties." Id.
1180 [Vol. 53:1175
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similar wrongs in the future.2'
C. Economic Efficiency
The more recently developed approach is one of Economic Efficiency, an
evaluation that seeks to demonstrate that the appropriate measure of the success or
failure of any law, including tort law, ought to proceed under an economic analysis.
Ordinary economic rationales have also described the role of compensatory damages
as an effective means of discouraging substandard or risk-creating conduct injuring
an unconsenting third party and thus bypassing the market. It is better, theoretically
at least, to pressure the actor into bargaining with any willing and knowing person for
the right to expose him to a risk.'
The conspicuous deterrence objective ofpunitive damages is seemingly endorsed
by the Restatement (Second) of Torts' standard that exemplary damages should be
"awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him
and others like him from similar conduct in the future."'  The deterrence objective
of punitive damages is so strong that some authority exists for the appropriateness of
awards even when the actor has died, on the theory that even in the absence of a
punishment dedicated to a living person, such an award is warranted in that it will
deter other similarly situated living actors from pursuing the same course of conduct.
It plausibly can be argued that the availability of punitive damages is a necessary,
but not by itself sufficient, component to discourage wanton harmful conduct. As to
the arguable necessity of such damages in some form, there is a continued value for
punitive damages, be they in mediated or unmediated form. Put another way, the
imposition of conventional Corrective Justice measures, resulting upon properproof
in the compensation of the plaintiff for his proved loss, will concededly instill some
hesitance in the actor to perpetuate the same conduct again. However, the majority
of states continue to conclude that more than simple compensatory damages is
necessary to discourage misbehavior at its extreme. Thus, for example, in the
influential decision handed down by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Wangen v.
21. The corrective justice objective of deterrence is evidenced in scholarly writings dating back
to the nineteenth century. In 1890, one academic authorwrote aboutthe goals ofthe negligence action:
"The really importantmatter is to adjust the disputebetween theparties by arule of conductwhich shall
do justice if possible in the particular case, but which shall also be suitable to the needs of the
community, and tend to prevent like accidents from happening in [the] future." William Schofield,
Davies v. Mann: Theory of Contributory Negligence, 3 HARV.L.REv. 263,269 (1890); accordBarrett
v. Superior Court, 272 Cal. Rptr. 304,308 (Ct. App. 1990). The Barrett court commented further that
by choosing not to limit the measure of damages, "California has chosen 'to strengthen the deterrent
aspect of the civil sanction: "the sting of unlimited recovery... more effectively penalize[s] the
culpable defendant and deter[s] it and others similarly situated from such future conduct' "... rather
than to protect defendants from excessive financial burdens."Id at308 (alteration in original) (citations
omitted); see also Pierce v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 212 Cal. Rptr. 283,291 (Ct. App. 1985) (stating one
principal purpose of strict liability was "to provide an economic incentive for improved product
safety").
22. Today one cannot help but think of the newest "trash" TV shows "Fear Factor" and "The
Chair" and derivatives thereof.
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).
2002] 1181
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FordMotor Co.,24 Ford argued that the magnitude of potential compensatory damages
in a serious injury case was itself sufficient incentive to the bringing of lawsuits to
redress injuries.2" The court responded that Ford was only partly correct and that
punitive damages were a necessary gear in the machinery of tort law incentives for
a large number of actions that might not otherwise be filed.26 The court wrote that
"Ford may be right [that the prospect of significant compensatory damages will
provide sufficient incentive for the bringing of claims] where injuries are very severe,
but it is probably wrong ... where injuries are moderate or minor."'27 The court
buttressed its conclusion that punitive damages may be appropriate in such latter
instances by proposing that "even if the injury to each individual is not severe, there
is a public need to deter the production of unreasonably [un]safe products, and the
availability of punitive damages increases the likelihood that the injured customer will
sue for recovery.
21
It is difficult to maintain that simple responsibility in indemnification sends a
strong message to others similarly situated to discontinue such egregious conduct,
particularly in circumstances in which the actual penalty may be incurred not by the
actor, but rather by its insurance carrier. Additionally, simple compensatory awards
fail to satisfy the long recognized, if not uniformly respected, community wish to
make an example of those whose conduct has gone beyond simple carelessness into
the realm of wantonness and its fellow traveler, immorality.
Additionally, while the Economic Efficiency model for tort liability may provide
an adequate rationale for compensatory damages, its inherent limitations point to the
need for the extraordinary remedy of punitive damages. The Economic Efficiency
approach to explaining ordinary compensatory damage awards has been illustrated
by Judge Posner, enlisting the law of battery-the common law rule concerning
liability for harmful or offensive touching. Quite apart from the Corrective Justice,
morality, and fairness attributes of tort law for battery, the law and economics
argument is that the doctrine should "dete[r] persons from engaging in activities that
a reasonable person would view ahead of time to be socially wasteful." 9 Posner
illustrates this proposition with the decision in Garratt v. Dailey." Garratt is
remembered as the case in which the five-year-old Dailey pulled away the lawn chair
as his, until that point, affectionate aunt was in the process of sitting down.3
Proponents of the Economic Efficiency model would argue that tort liability in battery
would serve the efficiency objective, irrespective of whether Dailey received any
psychological or material benefit from the act. If the harm to his aunt exceeded any
benefits to Dailey, a simple utilitarian analysis would support the imposition of
24. 294 N.W.2d 437 (Wis. 1980).
25. Id. at441
26. Id. at 448.
27. Id. at 452.
28. Id. at 452-53.
29. See JAMES A. HENDERON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 29 (4th ed. 1994) (discussing
POSNER, supra note 19, at 206-11.
30. 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955).
31. Id. at 1092.
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liability. On the other hand, if Dailey derived benefits that exceeded any physical or
emotional injury to his aunt, pulling the chair out was wasteful or inefficient. Why
wasteful? Because the transaction-the act and the harm-without the aunt's consent
could generate sizeable accident costs, not the least of the costs being substantial
litigation costs. In Posner's words, such torts
involve ... a coerced transfer of wealth to the defendant in a setting
of low transaction costs. Such conduct is inefficient because it
violates the principle that where market transaction costs are low,
people should be required to use the market if they can and to desist
from the conduct if they can't.32
Thus, in this simplified paradigm of the application of the efficiency model to the
classic tort of battery, plaintiff's loss serves as a proxy for the calculation of what
waste or avoidable accident costs the defendant's inefficient conduct has occasioned.
However, the mere description of the efficiency rationale betrays its incapacity to
satisfactorily deal with risk-creating behavior ofthe most extreme type. An award of
compensatory damages, be it thought of in terms of simple Corrective Justice or as
a proxy for accident costs incurred by the defendant's inefficient behavior, meets its
limitation in settings involving extreme conduct characteristic of punitive damages.
Economic Efficiency proponents assert that the actor is properly punished for failing
to resort to the market to seek contractual authorization for his conduct. However, the
existence of a market for such agreement predicates this assumption. Persons do, of
course, bargain away degrees ofsafety-witness the popularity ofthrill rides at theme
parks and the accompanying purported waivers of liability. Yet, in the context of
willful, wanton, or deliberate risk-creating behavior, which often translates into injury,
severe or otherwise, to many persons, one is unlikely to find any lucid person or
group of persons prepared to bargain away their relative safety.
IV. MODERN LEGISLATIVE CONTROL AND CONSTITUTIONAL SUPERVISION
A. Generally
Modem legislative reform has taken several approaches. To name only a few,
many jurisdictions require that punitive damages may be awarded only on proof by
"clear and convincing evidence" of the defalcation.33 Three states allow the jury to
determine the availability of punitive damages, but place the decision as to the
amount of the award in the hands of the court.34 Other initiatives to limit jury
32. POsNER, supra note 19, at 208.
33. See, e.g., M!NN.STAT.ANN. § 549.20(1)(a) (West2000) (applyingthe "clearand convincing"
standard). The several variations of state law reform are summarized atEPsTEIN,supra note 1, at464-
65.
34. CONN.GEN. STAT.ANN. § 52-240b (West 1991); KAN.STAT.ANN. § 60-3701(a) (1991); 0Ho
REV. CODE. ANN. § 2307.80(B) (Anderson 2001); see generally DAVID G. OWEN, M. STUARTMADDEN
& MARY J. DAvis, 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCrs LIABILITY § 18:6 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter
2002] 1183
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discretion in punitive damages decisions include confining such awards to multiples
of the compensatory damages awarded .
3
To moderate the phenomenon of punitive damages, a remarkably interested
Supreme Court has accepted the invitation to examine state punitive damages law
under the lenses of the Due Process, the Excessive Fines, and the No Review Clauses.
B. The Supreme Court's Intervention
In three influential decisions between 1991 and 1996 the Supreme Court
answered important questions about the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due
process limitations on the prerogatives of state court juries to award punitive damages.
In these three decisions, Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,36 TXO
Productions Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,37 and BMWI of North America, Inc.
v. Gore.,38 the Court established that neither the Due Process Clause nor the Eighth
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause would be violated if exemplary awards were
imposed pursuant to reasonably intelligible jury instructions, upheld on the basis of
rational standards, and were not "clearly excessive."
In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.," the Court, in the
context of its three prior holdings, squared the box by establishing the standard for
federal appellate courts reviewing punitive awards.' The Cooper Court held that a
combination of due process, jury function, and trial and appellate court expertise
considerations commended de novo review of jury punitive damage judgements.41
Although both the majority42 and the dissenting43 opinions conceded that the issue
might have more philosophical effect than practical consequence, members of the
defense and the plaintiffs' bar have suggested that the decision exhibits the Court's
pro-business orientation. Regardless, Cooper stands as a marvelous tutorial in the role
of punitive damage awards in American civil litigation.'
The Supreme Court has visited core punitive damage issues with a devotion
accorded few other constitutional issues, and with an emphasis, at least prior to
Cooper, upon substantive due process limitations that should be imposed upon jury
MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODuCTs LIABILITY] (discussing legislative reform pertaining to punitive
damages).
35. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102(I)(a) (West 1997) (stating punitive damages
may not exceed compensatory damages); see also 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILrrY, supra
note 36, § 18:6, at308 (listing states with statutory cap onpunitive damages such as Connecticut, North
Dakota and Texas (two times compensatory damages); Florida and Nevada (three times); Maryland
legislative proposal (four times); and New Jersey (greater of five times or $350,000)).
36. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
37. 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (plurality opinion).
38. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
39. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
40. Id. at 443.
41. Id. at 437-40.
42. Id. at 441.
43. Id. at 448 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
44. There is much evidence that the bark of potential punitive damage liability is greater than its
bite, but that examination is beyond present purposes.
1184 [Vol. 53: 1175
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discretion in such awards. In the first of the three most important of these decisions,
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,4s the Court described such awards as
performing a "quasi-criminal"' function intended as "private fines"'47 that would
punish the defendant and deter future wrongful conduct.48 In Haslip, the Court
considered an Alabama jury's punitive damages award of $800,000 that had been
rendered against an insurance agent and his employer for the agent's fraud in
collecting and keeping insurance premiums even after the plaintiffs' policies hadbeen
cancelled.49 The award was approximately four times the plaintiffs' proved loss.5"
Examining the award against the backdrop of Alabama jury instructions, and in view
of that state's established standards for appellate review of exemplary awards, the
Court stated that while the award might be "close to the [constitutional] line," it was
not so large as to violate due process." The Court paid particular attention to that
jurisdiction's three levels of procedural safeguards: jury instructions, post-verdict
review by the trial court, and appellate review.52 The jury's instructions afforded
"significanf' but not "unlimited" discretion, in that they set forth the purposes for
such awards-deterrence and punishment 53 Similarly, the Court found the post-
verdict review procedure sufficient because trial courts were required "to reflect in the
record the reasons for interfering with the a jury verdict, or refusing to do so, on
grounds of excessiveness of the damages."'54 Finally, it considered the appellate
review which, pursuant to decisions of the Alabama Supreme Court, required
consideration of numerous factors relating to the relationship between the
compensatory and the punitive awards, the reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct, the profitability of the conduct, and the defendant's financial position.5
In TXO Productions Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 5 the Court affimed a
$10 million punitive damages award following trial of a dispute over oil and gas
development rights in West Virginia.5 7 TXO had sought a declaratory judgment
regarding the rights, following which Allied brought a counterclaim for slander of
title.5" Finding in favor of Alliance, the jury had awarded $19,000 in actual damages.59
Applying a "grossly excessive" standard, the Court took particular note of TXO's
misconduct, and wrote:
45. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
46. Id. at 19.
47. Id. at 47 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350
(1974)).
48. Id. at 19.
49. Id. at 4-7.
50. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23.
51. Id. at 23-24.
52. Id. at 19-23.
53. Id. at 19.
54. Id. at 20.
55. Id. at 20-22.
56. 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
57. Id. at 443.
58. Id. at 447.
59. Id. at 451.
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[We] do not consider the dramatic disparity between actual
damages and the punitive award controlling in a case of this
character. On this record, the jury may reasonably have determined
that petitioner set out on a malicious and fraudulent course to win
back, either in whole or in part, the lucrative stream of royalties that
it had ceded to Alliance. The punitive damages in this case [are]
certainly large, but in light of the money potentially at stake, the
bad faith of [TXO], the fact that the scheme employed in this case
was part of a larger pattern of fraud, trickery and deceit, and
petitioner's wealth, we are not persuaded that the award was so
"grossly excessive" as to be beyond the power of the states to
allow.6"
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,6' evolved from plaintiff's damage action
which he brought upon learning that his vehicle, purchased as "new," had actually
been partially repainted after being damaged in transit by acid rain.6 The jury
awarded him $4,000 in compensatory damages, and $4 million in punitive damages.63
The Alabama Supreme Court reduced the punitive award to $2 million." The United
States Supreme Court began its analysis by acknowledging that a state may employ
punitive damages to punish and deter misconduct." Then, reiterating a "grossly
excessive" standard of review, the Court continued: "Only when an award can fairly
be categorized as 'grossly excessive' in relation to these interests does it enter the
zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 66 The Court held that a principal flaw in the Gore verdict was that the
evidence admitted and considered by thejury had included each of the approximately
1000 instances in which BMW had sold such similarly repaired vehicles nationwide,
including sales in states in which such sales violated no consumer protection laws.67
The reach of the verdict contemplated the erroneously-perceived interests of other
states, potentially violating interstate comity that could "infring[e] on the policy
choices of other States."6 Thus, the Supreme Court found that when only Alabama's
punishment and deterrence interests were taken into account, the $2 million award
was "clearly excessive. 69 The Gore Court continued by identifying three guideposts
for determining if a punitive award was "grossly excessive": (1) the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct, (2) the reasonableness of the
relationship (the "ratio") of the punitive award to the compensatory award, and (3) a
60. Id. at462.
61. 517 U.S..559 (1996).
62. Id. at 563.
63. Id. at 565.
64. Id. at 567.
65. Id. at 568.
66. Id. at 568 (citing TXO Prods. Corp., 509 U.S. at 456).
67. Gore, 517 U.S. at 570-72.
68. Id. at 572.
69. Id. at 574.
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comparison with the other civil and criminal penalties imposed or authorized in such
cases.
70
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group., Inc.7" involved two
manufacturers of multifunction hand tools, both seeking to improve the venerable
Swiss army knife.72 Leatherman's tool enjoyed the dominant market position at the
time Cooper undertook to introduce its new product73 In the course of promoting its
new product, but before commencing its actual production and sale, Cooper used in
its advertising materials photographs of a modification of the Leatherman product.74
Leatherman filed trade-dress infringement, unfair competition, and false advertising
claims under the Lanham Act,75 and common law claims of unfair competition.76 The
jury awarded $50,000 in actual damages and entered a $4.5 million punitive damage
verdict as well.77 The trial court rejected Cooper's post-trial claims that the punitive
damage award was "grossly excessive,"" and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the punitive damages award, finding that the trial court had not "abuse[d] its
discretion in declining to reduce the amount."'79
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the single issue ofwhether the appellate
court's application of an "abuse of discretion" standard in its review was proper, as
contrasted with review on a de novo basis.8" Reversing and remanding, the Court held
that in matters of appellate review of punitive damage awards, federal appeals courts
should employ de novo review.' In so doing, the Court principally focused on three
considerations: (1) the departure of punitive damage awards from ordinary "findings
of face' associated with awards of compensatory damages; (2) the respective
capacities of the trial and appellate courts to apply the indicia established in BMf of
North America, Inc. v. Gore.;82 and (3) the virtues of appellate court de novo review
in the achievement of a semblance of uniformity and predictability in allowable
exemplary damage awards.
83
70. Id. at 574-75; see generally 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTs LIABILITY, supra note 36,
§ 18:7, at324-25 (using Gore as a primary example for instructing courts on how to use due process to
strike down excessive punitive damages awards).




75. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
76. Cooper Indus., Inc., 532 U.S. at 428.
77. Id. at429.
78. Id.
79. Id. at431 (quoting Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., No. CV-96-1346-MA,
1999 WL 1216844, at **2 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 1999)).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 517 U.S. 559 (1996); see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
83. Cooperlndus., Inc., 532 U.S. at 431-42.
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1. Exemplary Awards Differ From Compensatory Damage Findings of
Fact
The Seventh Amendment's Re-examination Clause "controls the allocation of
authority to review verdicts"84 and provides that "no fact tried by jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules
of the common law."" s It has been accepted generally that the Re-examination Clause
is not violated by appellate review applying a deferential "clearly erroneous"
standard.86 Central to the Court's analysis in Cooper was its conclusion that punitive
damage awards differ from ordinary jury findings of fact, and therefore may be
subject to appellate review without the constraints of the Re-examination Clause.8" In
the Court's words, "[u]nlike the measure of actual damages suffered, which presents
a question of historical or predictive fact,.. . the level of punitive damages is not
really a 'fact' 'tried' by the jury."88 Rather, in the Court's view, awards of exemplary
damages are "expression[s] of ...moral condemnation" intended to "punish
reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence."89
2. Respective Trial and Appellate Court Capacity
While the "Jury Trial" and Re-examination Clauses make essential obeisances
to the trial court's superior position in evaluating what proof is to be admitted into
evidence and whether sufficient support exists for conventional findings of fact, the
Court's conclusion that awards of exemplary damages do not constitute conventional
findings of fact invited it to consider which vantage point-that of the trial court or
that of the appellate court-was superior for application of the Gore factors. If the
appeals courts were better able to apply the Gore factors, such a conclusion would
bolster the argument that the "clearly erroneous" standard of review would be less
warranted, and hence more support for de novo review by the appeals court.
Taking the Gore factors seriatim, the Court conceded that as to the first Gore
factor requiring consideration of the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct, the trial courts "have a somewhat superior vantage over courts of appeals,"
but added "that the advantage exists primarily with respect to issues turning on
witness credibility and demeanor."9
As to the second Gore factor, relating to "the disparity between the harm (or
potential harm) suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damage award," the Court
84. Gasperini v. Cr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996).
85. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
86. Cooper Indus., Inc., 532 U.S. at 437-40.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 437 (quoting Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 459 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted)).
89. Id. at 432 (citations omitted).
90. Id. at440. Contrast the evaluation ofJustice Ginsberg, who states that regarding the first Gore
in dictum the trial courts "have an undeniably superior vantage over courts of appeal" in evaluating the
first criterion, that of the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, insofar as the trial court views the
evidence not as reflected in a "cold paper record" but rather "in the living courtroom context." Id. at
445, 448 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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determined that "[t]rial courts and appellate courts seem equally capable of analyzing
the second factor."9' Lastly, the third factor's call for consideration of "the difference
between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized
or imposed in comparable cases" called, in the Court's view, "for a broad legal
comparison... more suited to the expertise of appellate courts."92 Taken in the
aggregate, the majority concluded that "[c]onsiderations of institutional competence
therefore fail to tip the balance in favor of [the] deferential [clearly erroneous standard
of] review."9
3. The Value of Uniformity and Predictability
The Court also highlighted the objectives of bringing uniformity and
predictability to review of exemplary damage awards. It stated that "[i]ndependent
review is therefore necessary if appellate courts are to maintain control of, and to
clarify, the legal principles."94 Quoting Justice Breyer's concurrence in Gore, the
Court emphasized that "[r]equiring the application of law, rather than a
decisionmaker's caprice, does more than simply provide citizens notice of what
actions might subject them to punishment; it also helps to assure the uniform
treatment of similarly situated persons that is the essence of law itself."'
4. Justice Ginsberg's Dissent
The gravamen of Mrs. Justice Ginsberg's dissent was that the majority erred in
finding that awards of punitive damages were not "findings of fact" 'within the reach
of the Re-examination Clause. Adopting the majority's language that a telling
characteristic of findings of fact is their character as "historical or predictive fact,"
Justice Ginsberg conceded that exemplary awards involved a panoply of
considerations.9" However, she continued by urging that while punitive awards
differed from compensatory awards in the cluster of considerations that make up the
jury verdict, the difference was a matter of degree and not of kind. "[T]here can be
no question that ajury's verdict on punitive damages is fundamentally dependent on
determinations we characterize as factfindings," she wrote, using as examples "the
extent of harm or potential harm caused by the defendant's misconduct, whether the
defendant acted in good faith, whether the misconduct was an individual instance or
part ofabroaderpattern, [and] whether the defendant behaved negligently, recklessly,
or maliciously."' Justice Ginsburg asserted that the inexact relationbetween an award
of punitive damages and a compensatory damage award should not vitiate the
91. Id. at 441.
92. Cooper Indus., Inc., 532 U.S. at 441.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 436.
95. Id. (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 587 (Breyer, ., concurring)).
96. Id. at 446 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
97. Id.
98. Cooper Indus., Inc., 532 U.S. at 446.
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underlying reality that each is tethered to jury findings of fact. Using noneconomic
damages (usually pain and suffering) as a basis for comparison, Justice Ginsberg
suggested that "[o]ne million dollars' worth of pain and suffering does not exist as a
'fact' in the world any more or less than one million dollars' worth of moral outrage.
Both derive their meaning from a set of underlying facts as determined by a jury. If
one set of quantification is properly regarded as factfinding, it seems to me that the
other should be so regarded as well."99
5. What Will Be The Impact of Cooper?
In anticipatory humility, the Cooper majority concurred with the dissent in
admitting that the redefined appellate role of de novo review "will affect the result of
the Gore analysis in only a relatively small number of cases[,]' ' ° and thus there is
reason to surmise that the impact of Cooper will not materially change the quantity
of punitive damage awards handed down by juries, nor the quantum of the individual
awards. Federal trial court judges now have years of experience in applying the Gore
factors, and there has been no indication that they have failed to execute the Supreme
Court's charge in that decision as faithfully as they must any other instruction from
the Court, including the gratuitously minimized trial court capacity to evaluate "the
difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties
authorized or imposed in comparable cases."'O'
It is delicious, nonetheless, to speculate whether the trial bar will develop special
interrogatories for jurors in exemplary award cases in an effort to provide a fact-based
underpinning that could move a court to conclude that the award of exemplary
damages was indeed a conclusion based upon "historic or predictive fact," and thus
akin to conventional compensatory damage awards suited to "clearly erroneous,"
rather than de novo, review.
V. CONCLUSION
An irony of punitive damages is that the tort remedy intended as a prophylaxis
for conduct so aggravated as to require extraordinary, noncompensatory measures for
its containment will itself continue to prompt vigorous state and constitutional law
restraints-a modem genie in the bottle. While abolishing punitive damages
altogether remains an option to state legislatures, most states will almost certainly
continue to preserve exemplary awards for truly outrageous conduct as a necessary
instrument in correcting the under-deterrence of ordinary compensatory damages. At
the same time, states canbe expected to experiment with various forms of limitations,
or develop new ones, to ameliorate the claimed overdeterrence risks of broad jury
discretion in the entry of such awards.
99. Id. (citations omitted).
100. 121 S. Ct. at 1688.
101. Id. at 440.
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The Due Process and Excessive Fines Clauses importantly frame the boundaries
ofpermissible awards in terms that hearken to conventional fairness goals of remedies
for avoidable accidents. The Haslip, TXO, Gore, and Cooper decisions establish the
Supreme Court's position that while constitutionally lawful, important substantive
restrictions and mechanisms for the consistent application of those restrictions are
necessary dimensions of the continued application of exemplary awards. In essence,
the Supreme Court has imposed a constitutional requirement that punitive damage
awards will only pass constitutional muster after successful passage through several
fairness checkpoints.
In tort law's lengthy development ofgoveming liability for causing injurious and
avoidable accidents, it has been a truism that common law causes of actions and
remedies have developed by accretion, with new remedies or limitations advanced
upon the presentation of new facts, developing societal expectations, or both. At the
same time, state legislatures have not balked at the task of sculpting or placing
limitations upon such judicially-created remedies. In no area of tort law is the
influence of state legislative and United States constitutional collaboration more
focused than in the law of exemplary damages. In a petrie dish in which the these
creative and restrictive agents alike have been introduced, each modifying, retarding,
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